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Abstract
It is generally accepted that excessive exuberance or gloom in investor sentiment contributes
to booms and crashes in share prices. However, views diﬀer on the merits of active policy
intervention due to gaps in our understanding of the transmission mechanism. To ﬁll this gap
we apply a fully ex ante valuation model in which an index of investor sentiment is included
along with earnings and growth fundamentals to explain value. The outcome is a precise
indication of the value relevance of sentiment. We employ the investor sentiment indicator
proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2007). Valuation, and implied permanent growth, based
on the inclusion of standard fundamentals is compared with that obtained when sentiment
is added. The resulting ratio produces an index of ’the valuation eﬀects of sentiment’ that
can be assessed with statistical signiﬁcance. Out-of-sample ﬁt is also examined. For the
Dow index the valuation eﬀects of sentiment are signiﬁcant and as large as 40% of market
value at the peak of the ’dot-com’ bubble. The index we propose identiﬁes conditions,
detectable in advance and under the control of policy makers, that are conducive to the
creation of asset bubbles. It is easy to construct, timely, robust and can be used improve
our understanding of what leads to bubbles and crashes and to inform policy.
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Investor sentiment, rather than real ’value-enhancing’ earnings performance, is often thought to
drive the value of the equity market. While there is a lot of evidence for excess volatility of returns
(or excess price-earnings ratios) that cannot be explained by variation in fundamentals, an agreed-
upon methodology for quantifying the actual contribution of investor sentiment to value is not
yet available. Sentiment movements do not always result in proportionate market movements and
the transmission mechanism involves complex interactions between sentiment and other variables
used in the valuation exercise. This poses a problem for policy makers concerned with identifying
the existence, magnitude and causes of ’bubbles’. We apply an ex ante approach to fundamental
valuation of stock market equity that controls for non-linear and interactive sentiment eﬀects. A
novel aspect of our approach is the use of forecasts of macroeconomic variables and other ex ante
measures that are not usually used in such valuations. These include option-implied ’betas’ and
forecasts of the macroeconomic drivers of earnings growth taken from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. We ﬁnd that sentiment is often
responsible for a signiﬁcant proportion of market valuation (in the region of 40% during the ’dot-
com’ bubble). The bubble eﬀects are distributed unevenly across sectors with ﬁnance and technology
stocks being more prone to such eﬀects. Our measure of market dislocation can be used to inform
macro-prudential policy aimed at avoiding the eﬀects of excessive exuberance or gloom. It can also
be related to other market psychology indicators and policy variables with the objective of gaining





The idea that investor sentiment is part of what drives stock markets is a well established 
theme.  Shiller (2005) is just one example of a vast literature that provides evidence of the 
probable presence of such effects.  As yet however, a timely and generally accepted indicator 
of the valuation consequences of these effects remains elusive.  Furthermore, we find that the 
transmission of sentiment to valuation involves non-linear interactions with other variables in 
the  valuation  process  so  that  sentiment  indicators  alone  are  insufficient  to  warn  of  the 
potentially harmful  effects  of investor  exuberance or  gloom.  Using  ex ante estimates  of 
valuation  fundamentals  our  analysis  gives  rise  to  an  indicator  of  the  valuation  effects  of 
investor sentiment.  We apply simple nonlinear regression analysis that incorporates sufficient 
constraints to ensure a robust representation of the valuation relationship given the available 
information at each date.  Our analysis indicates the importance of assessing sentiment effects 
in relation to the divergence between the cost of equity capital and the expected long-term 
growth in earnings.  It also identifies periods in which conditions are conducive to bubbles 
arising from sentiment shocks.  These conditions can be detected in advance and are largely 
under the control of policy makers.  
 
Following  the  recent  financial  crisis  there  has  been  renewed  interest  in  the  debate  as  to 
whether monetary policy should be used to prick asset, and real estate, price bubbles.
1  After 
the peak of the crisis fears abounded that bubbles were developing in commodities markets 
and  in  emerging  economies  as  a  direct  result  of  the  prolonged  low  interest  rate  and 
quantitative easing policies conducted in crisis-hit economies.  At his confirmation hearing in 
the fall of 2009 the Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke described this as “the 
most difficult problem for monetary policy this decade.”
2  Thus, while policy makers are 
often fearful of such occurrences they are seldom able to quantify their magnitude and this has 
implications for how confidently they can proceed in redressing the situation.  The pre-crisis 
view about bubbles is associated with Bernanke and Gertler (2001) where a passive policy 
stance is advocated largely motivated by the view that bubbles are hard to detect and that any 
monetary policy reaction could magnify their dynamics.  Recently, however, there is less 
unanimity about the presumed difficulty of identifying bubbles.  The president of the New 
                                                 
1 See “Fed Debates New Role: Bubble Fighter”, by John Hilsenrath, Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2009 page 
A1. 
2 More formal examination of the pre-crisis period by Adrian and Shin (2009) found that borrowing in the repo 
market was a probable cause of the housing and credit bubble.  
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York  Federal  Reserve  recently  stated  that  “bubbles  may  not  be  that  hard  to  identify  – 
especially large ones.”
3  He also stated in the same speech... “I agree that the instrument of 
short term interest rates is not well-suited to deal with asset bubbles….this suggests that it 
might  be  better  for  central  bankers  to  examine  the  efficacy  of  other  instruments  in  their 
toolbox, rather than simply ignoring the development of asset bubbles.”  This growing but 
cautiously positive stance towards policy activism (of whatever type) in respect of asset price 
bubbles greatly depends on how quickly and accurately such bubbles can be identified and 
measured. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to show that equity market valuations can indeed be attributed to 
a combination of fundamentals and sentiment-related exuberance or gloom represented by 
well-known and reliable indices of investor sentiment.  But this effect should be viewed in the 
context of its non-linear relation with other macroeconomic inputs to the valuation process.  
Once a non-linear valuation metric is adopted there is a higher chance of errors in out-of-
sample forecasting but when these errors are properly interpreted they are very informative 
regarding the potential effects of sentiment.  This is particularly true when the required rate of 
return on equity and expected long-term  growth rates are similar in magnitude.  In these 
circumstances  sentiment  changes  can  begin  to  dominate  the  valuation process.  Thus,  by 
applying a well understood valuation metric and using few steps or estimation constraints, we 
identify  valuation  effects  that  can  be  robustly  attributed  to  sentiment.    Our  approach 
contributes to the extant literature that seeks to measure the role of earnings or dividend 
fundamentals such as Campbell and Shiller (1988a & 1988b) or that explain returns rather 
than valuation levels as a function of sentiment, such as Baker and Wurgler (2007).  However, 
previous studies typically avoid the step of capitalizing dividends or earnings and focus on 
excessive  price-to-earnings  or  dividend  ratios  as  evidence  for  exuberance  and  sentiment 
effects.    These  studies  therefore  side-step  important  non-linear  effects  that  reduce  the 
precision of estimated results.  Our contribution is to introduce ex ante variables fundamental 
to equity valuation to improve and simplify the capitalization of earnings so that intrinsic 
value and price can be directly compared.  We also proceed to examine the returns relation as 
an error correction process rather than as an asset pricing relation.  If returns can be regarded 
as  reversing market  inefficiencies on average over time then it is appropriate to  improve 
                                                 
3 Remarks by William C. Dudley entitled “Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis,” delivered at 8
th Annual 
BIS Conference, Basel, Switzerland. http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2009/dud090702.html  
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prediction of returns using our best estimates of such inefficiencies and this is precisely what 
an error correction representation achieves (see, Engle and Granger 1987). 
 
Our analysis extends previous attempts to uncover sentiment effects by using selected ex ante 
inputs more flexibly than previously.  In terms of our results we add to previous work by 
deriving two approaches to examining the valuation implication of sentiment.  We find this is 
necessary because the effects of sentiment are obscured if just one of the available viewpoints 
is considered.  The first viewpoint is based on a direct examination of the differences in the 
„with‟ and „without‟ sentiment valuations.  The second viewpoint is obtained by testing the 
significance of the difference in implied growth rates of earnings derived from the valuation 
exercise  with  and  without  sentiment  effects.    Variation  in  risk  aversion  is  a  plausible 
alternative avenue through which sentiment has its effects.  However, we prefer to attribute 
these to implied growth rather than risk aversion which is simply an identifying restriction 
that  has  little  significance  for  our  conclusion  that  sentiment  effects  are  an  identifiable 
component of valuation. 
 
As far as is practically possible, we use an ex ante valuation approach.  Given the forecasts of 
future earnings, three important unknowns remain in the valuation exercise.  These include (i) 
risk premia associated with various risk factors, (ii) stock-specific sensitivities to such factors 
and (iii), predictions of the long-run growth prospects for earnings.  We use a single risk 
factor and we make use of option-implied measures of stock-specific betas to expose an ex 
ante market risk premium.  The forward-looking betas from the analysis of Christoffersen, 
Jacobs and Vainberg (2008) are used as an input.
4  We test for the relevance of the Fama -
French and momentum factors in our analysis, but we do not find significant effects.
5  The 
complexity introduced by multiple risk factors and the error associated with their exclusion 
does not appear to be as detrimental for valuation accuracy as omitting sentiment effects.
6  
                                                 
4 This approach is supported by findings that stocks immune to sentiment are likely to possess option-implied 
betas that are a reliable reflection of ex-ante betas (Lemmon and Ni, 2008). 
5 There is little consensus on how many factors are needed to correctly price the risks associated with specific 
equity investments. Numerous asset pricing alternatives exist, such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory model, the 
Fama-French (1993) three factor model, the models outlined in Haugen and Baker (1996, 2009)  and Campbell 
and Vuoltenaho‟s  (2004)  Good-Beta/Bad-Beta  model.    With  additional  risk  factors  and  unknown  ex  ante 
sensitivities  to  these  factors  valuation  is  impossible  without  a  number  of  restrictions  that  can  always  be 
contested.  At a very basic level it is arguably the case that factors based on ex post portfolio returns are invalid 
in an ex ante context. 
6Some of these issues are addressed by the „behavioural finance‟ literature.  For example, Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995) use the “narrow framing” argument to explain overestimates of the risk premium by investors.  See also, 
Hirshleifer 2001, Brunnermeier 2001, Shiller 2005 and Epstein & Schneider 2008.  
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Indeed, Buss, Schlag and Vilkov (2009) show that a simple CAPM can be defended when 
sentiment  effects  are  either  absent  or  controlled  for.
7  Recent studies by Kumar,  Srescu, 
Boehme and Danielsen (2008) and Adrian and Franzoni (2009 ) demonstrate that once the 
estimation risk associated with beta and the risk premium are accounted for, the conditional 
CAPM has significant explanatory power in the cross-section of stock returns.  
 
We estimate long-run earnings growth as an implicit non-linear function of investor sentiment 
and economic growth.  We restrict the implied long term growth rate to be non -negative, but 
otherwise it is permitted to be a flexible functional form involving sentiment and other drivers 
of growth including forecasts of long-term real GDP growth expectations.  These expectations 
are obtained from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) compiled by the Philadelphia 
Federal Reserve.  The use of this  growth relation helps to mitigate the distorting effects of 
optimistic analyst forecasts (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Easton and Sommers, 2007, 
Ciciretti et al. 2009).
8  Our approach therefore has a macroeconomic focus and in this respect, 
it has a corres pondence with the asset price bubbles literature that uses macroeconomic 
fundamentals to identify market misalignments such as Bordo & Jeanne (2002), Detken and 
Smets (2004), Machado & Sousa (2006), Alessi and Detken (2009), Agnello and Sckucknecht 
(2009) and Gerdesmeier, Reimers and Roffia (2009).   Macroeconomic growth is generally 
slow moving (is related to expected future policy stances by monetary authorities) and used in 
combination with the near term I/B/E/S (hereafter IBES) forecasts of earnings reduce some of 




Since, the discounting process can introduce error we minimize this by using interest rate 
projections from the SPF in our discounting formulae .  This overcomes a  serious difficulty 
associated with the use of short term interest rates to represent the risk free rate  in such 
models.  Treasury Bill rates are often quite far from their expected long-run equilibrium and 
when they are used in capitali zation formulae such as the Gordon growth model, they can 
easily give rise to a negative denominator (i.e., a low risk free rate „r‟ and a high growth rate 
                                                 
7 Buss et al find that there no role for firm characteristics such as size and book-to-market in a low sentiment 
regime.   This finding is also supported by Chung & Yeh (2009). 
8While there may be incentives for analysts to exaggerate equity -specific earnings growth it is difficult to think 
of reasons why macroeconomic growth forecasts would contain similar biases.  
9 Sharpe (2002) has shown that forecasts of longer term earning g rowth possess the largest part of the bias in 
analysts‟  forecasts.   I/B/E/S stands  for Institutional Brokers‟ Estimate System  which is currently owned by 
Thomson Reuters.  
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„g‟ will produce a negative or extremely small, r-g).  We find that use of the long run forecast 
of the Treasury Bill yield from the Survey of Professional Forecasters avoids this problem.  
More importantly, by including long term expected risk free rates we are accounting for the 
agents‟ expectations of future monetary policy decisions.  Thus we obtain plausible results for 
all of the Dow Jones 30 equities examined for all of the time periods in our sample.  This 
reliability characteristic is an attractive feature rendering this method of practical benefit as an 
indicator of excessive sentiment effects. 
 
Two important findings are worthy of mention.  Firstly, we find that the valuation effects due 
to sentiment are quite pervasive.  For the majority of firms in our sample it is difficult to 
reject the hypothesis that sentiment accounts for a significant proportion of value.  We find 
that  „with‟  sentiment  valuations  can  be  almost  double  valuations  based  on  traditional 
fundamentals.  Our  sample  period  includes  the  dot-com  bubble  and  this  period  is  very 
accurately captured by the gap between price and fundamental valuation and much of this gap 
can be attributed to sentiment effects. Our findings support the view that bubbles can be 
identified and it therefore generates increased scope for arbitrage that could improve market 
efficiency.  The proposed indicator of the value relevance of sentiment can be used by policy 
makers to accurately identify, at an early stage and with statistical confidence, the presence of 
asset  price  misalignments  and  consider  policy  reactions  to  counteract  their  effects.    The 
production  of  a  more  accurate  and  timely  measure  of  the  valuation  effects  of  investor 
sentiment is, in our view, a pre-requisite for an important debate about the role of sentiment in 
asset bubbles and how these effects can be mollified by policy initiatives. 
 
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 outlines our valuation approach 
and  our  econometric  methodology.  Section  3  discusses  data  used  in  the  application  and 
Section 4 presents the main results with discussions about the likelihood of sentiment being a 
large contributor to valuations.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 An Old Valuation Metric with New Clothes 
 
To achieve a best fit for market prices given our earnings and macroeconomic information set 
we model fundamental value in the context of a modified Gordon Growth model that includes  
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various ex ante inputs omitted in previous studies.  The model is applied to earnings rather 
than dividends.
10 We use consensus IBES „core earnings‟ forecasts as the „above-the-line‟ 
drivers  of  fundamental  valuation  and  stock-specific  sensitivity  to  forecasts  of  long-term 
economic growth from the SPF as „below-the-line‟ drivers.  While we use a baseline valuation 
derived with inputs that are familiar in the extant literature, we also extend the valuation 
metric to include other variables.  We use the VIX index as an ex ante proxy for the amount 
of systematic equity risk.
11  The SPF provides long-run projections for real GDP growth and 
the risk free interest rate and we use ex-ante option implied betas from Christoffersen et al. 
(2008).    Thus,  our  approach  makes  use  of  a  number  of  ex  ante  that,  to  our  knowledge, 
surpasses  what  is  done  in  the  extant  literature.  We  proceed  to  outline  our  fundamental 
valuation metric firstly without and then including the effect of sentiment.  
 
For simplicity, the Gordon Growth model (Gordon, 1962) is applied to earnings from any 
specific equity as follows; 
    
  
      
     
Where,    is the market price per share for a given equity,    is core earnings per share,     is 
the cost of equity capital for the specific equity concerned, and   is considered to be the 
permanent real growth rate expected to apply to core earnings for the foreseeable future.  We 
assume that any pattern for future growth projections can be approximated in this way.  The 
use of the nominal interest rate in discounting should account for the effects of inflation 
expectations on earnings projections such that it would be appropriate for   to be the expected 
real rate of growth in earnings.  However if there is „money illusion‟ it may be necessary to 
include  inflation  expectations  separately  to  account  for  this  inefficiency.    Also,  expected 
inflation may in fact have a role in predicting future real growth since high expected inflation 
is usually associated with expected future contractionary macroeconomic policies.  We allow 
for this by including inflation expectations from the SPF in the more general specifications 
                                                 
10 Fama & French 2001, describe how the proportion of firms in the US that make dividend payments fell from 
66% in 1978 to only 20.8% in 1999.  This makes fundamental analysis based on dividends impractical for a large 
proportion of the market.  There is a large literature on dividend irrelevance begun by Modigliani & Miller 
(1961) and extended by Miller and Rock (1985) relating the dividend decision to one of signalling an absence of 
„over-investment‟.  Our view is uncertainty as to whether earnings are optimally distributed or reinvested is part 
of systematic risk and therefore mostly captured in stock-specific betas and in the implied risk premium.  We 
also regard the estimated growth rate of earnings as capable of reflecting differential earnings retention policies. 
11  Whaley (2008) provides an account of how the VIX index is related to st ock prices.  Typically, the 
relationship is inverse but during prolonged „bull‟ markets there is a positive relationship in the run up to market 
„corrections‟.  We include the VIX in the discounting of the near-term earnings only and we assume that the 
long-run historical average of the VIX can be used for discounting the 10 year ahead projected earnings.  
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described below.  The error term    includes all other drivers of value not captured by the 
simple model. These are omitted in the model extensions outlined below).   
 
The basic model above can easily be expanded to produce a more deconstructed model.  For 
example, we can let the required return on equity be determined as follows; 
  
      
                          
Where   
 is the risk free rate of return (specifically the SPF expectations of future Treasury 
bill  rates)  and     is  the  aforementioned  „forward-looking‟  option-implied  stock-specific 
sensitivity  to  market-wide  risk  proposed  by  Christoffersen  et  al  (2008).    To  indicate  the 
presence  of  a  time  varying  beta  we  add  a  time  subscript  in  future  notation.    We  derive 
fundamental valuation under the assumption of a constant level of risk aversion and a variable 
amount of systematic risk.  More specifically, we assume that the risk premium can be split 
into (i) an amount of expected future systematic risk represented by the VIX index and (ii) the 
price of risk in terms of excess return required by the average investor for exposure to such 
risk.  This gives rise to the following required return expression (where Q denotes the „price 
of risk‟ and VIX represents the expected amount of market risk); 
  
      
              
We initially estimate Q as a constant, thus, the squared error of the price-value relation is 
minimized over the entire sample). 
 
The long run-growth rate of earnings,   , is assumed to be a function of expectations of long 
run macroeconomic growth and inflation (SPF ten year ahead forecasts of average annual real 
GDP growth and ten year ahead forecasts of average annual CPI inflation).  This is; 
                                    
We  restrict  the  estimated  growth  term  to  be  positive  by  estimating  the  relation  with  the 
growth „sub-equation‟ squared.  This implies that there are interactions (multiplicative cross-
terms) between the various variables and constants in the growth equation.   
 
We  use  a  further  modification  of  the  Gordon  growth  formula  so  that  permanent  growth 
applies  only  after  period  2.  This  takes  account  of  the  fact  that  we  have  IBES  earnings  
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forecasts in respect of Fiscal Year 1 (FY1) and Fiscal Year 2 (FY2).  The basic valuation 
equation is as follows:
12 
           
    
       
            
    
    
     
          
 
      
                                           
   (1) 
Where: 
  = Market price per share for a specific equity at time t,  
    = fitted fundamental value per share for a specific equity at time t,  
FY1t = IBES current fiscal year „core‟ earnings per share forecasts (where the most recent or 
next annual earnings are forecasted each month), 
FY2t = IBES next fiscal year (or two year ahead) „core‟ earnings per share forecasts (annual), 
   
  = Survey of Professional Forecasters‟ 3 month T-bill rate for the current year, 
    
  = Survey of Professional Forecasters‟ 3 month T-bill rate (expected 10 year average),  
  = an ex ante, option-implied, stock-specific, time-varying beta,  
    = the VIX/10 represents the ex ante, amount of market risk implied by S&P500 one-
month ahead options. We assume that investors expect the VIX to return to its long run 
average in the very long term and this enters the last term in the denominator.  The long run 
value for this           is set equal to its historical median = 1.888 as described by Whaley (2008), 
       = Real GDP long-term growth expected.  This is based on the SPF forecast of 10 
year average real GDP growth, 
      = long-term growth in prices expected.  This is based on the SPF forecast of 10 year 
average inflation expectations, 
       = parameters describing the equity-specific growth level expected on average over the 
whole sample and the implicit relation between variation in firm-level long-term growth in 
earnings and expected 10 year Real GDP growth and CPI inflation, 
   = a number to be solved-out that will represent the equilibrium price of systematic risk, 
  and   are the appropriate exponents for discounting FY1 and FY2 respectively, the required 
number of months from the forecast date to the date of recognizing the earnings in annual 
accounts (we divide the required rate of return by 12 so that it applies to monthly time value 
adjustments, not shown in the formula for clarity in the exposition. 
                                                 
12 We take natural logs of both sides when estimating the relation and assume an additive regression error which 




The main missing variables in  equation (1) include additional risk  factors and a  role  for 
sentiment effects.  Our preference is to exclude other risk factors since they are not available 
to investors in an ex ante sense.  However, to support this stance we statistically test whether 
the exclusion of Fama-French and momentum factors significantly reduces the goodness of fit 
when the following more general model is estimated (where, as usual, SMB means small 
minus big, HML means high minus low and MOM means momentum);
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 .  (1‟) 
Once  we  introduce  the  Fama-French  factors  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  the  model 
becomes a hybrid of ex ante and ex post variables, in our view weakening its appeal.  We 
assume that the Fama-French and Momentum factors are expected to be zero in the long-run 
so they do not feature in the final part of the denominator of the discounting formula. 
  
We now consider the issue of sentiment effects.  We use an investor sentiment index taken 
directly from the work of Baker and Wurgler (2006) to augment the basic valuation model.  
The index is a linear combination (principal factor) of six investor sentiment measures that are 
considered to be clean of endogeneity effects.  The index fluctuates around zero which is not 
necessarily a neutral level of sentiment but is likely to be a close approximation to it.  Baker 
and Wurgler describe their index as  an indicator of the propensity  to  speculate and they 
describe how this propensity more readily expresses itself in the prices of stocks that are 
difficult to value.  They add; 
“in the case of young, unprofitable, extreme growth stocks the lack of an earnings 
history  combined  with  the  presence  of  apparently  unlimited  growth  opportunities 
allows unsophisticated investors to defend, with equal plausibility, a wide spectrum of 
valuations, from much too low to much too high, as suits their sentiment.  During a 
bubble period, when the propensity to speculate is high, this profile of characteristics 
also allows investment bankers (or swindlers) to further argue for the high end of 
valuations.  By  contrast, the value of a firm  with  a long earnings  history, tangible 
assets, and stable dividends is much less subjective, and thus its stock is likely to be 
less affected by fluctuations in the propensity to speculate.” .  Baker and Wurgler 
2007: page  
 
                                                 
13 We obtained the Fama-French (and momentum) factors from Kenneth French‟s web-based data-library.  
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We account for sentiment effects in terms of implied growth.  We include it as an explanatory 
variable in the long-run growth sub-equation.  Since the growth sub-equation is squared this 
implies that sentiment interacts with the other growth related variables.  The motivation for 
including sentiment in the growth equation is (i) to allow for the effects of cheaper funding,  
and higher likelihood of investment and expansion actually occurring, when sentiment is high 
as described in Yuan (2005) and (ii) to allow „exuberance‟ or „gloom‟ to behaviourally infect 
expectations of growth when sentiment is very high or very low.  Thus, the model „with 
sentiment‟ has the following form, where S is the sentiment index and we revert to a model 
that excludes the Fama-French variables; 
           
    
       
            
    
    
     
          
 
      
                                              
.   (2) 
The  growth  effects  arising  from  sentiment  can  be  ascertained  by  examination  of  the 
derivatives of the overall growth level with respect to sentiment and real GDP rather than the 
individual parameter estimates.   In our  results  section we  compare  the  estimated  implied 
growth rates when sentiment is included and excluded, at a sectoral and market level.  The 
main derivative of interest (for neutral sentiment, S=0.0) is; 
  
   
                                 
                 .  We evaluate this derivative at the sample average of the variables RGDP10 and 
CPI10. 
 
Ideally, we would like to impose equality in the risk aversion parameter „Q‟ across all stocks.  
We  test  this  restriction  but  only  find  it  to  be  acceptable  in  about  half  of  the  30  cases 
considered.  It is possible that there is bias in the average level of the estimated stock betas 
and this is likely to alter the implied risk aversion parameter consistent with a good fit of the 
price-value relation and render an imposed restriction invalid.  Since it is not essential for our 
analysis,  we  relax  the  common  risk  aversion  restriction.  We  do  however  present  results 
regarding the testing of this restriction.  
 
At a basic level it is indeterminate whether sentiment should be included as a driver of risk 
aversion rather than of growth perceptions since both have the same type of effects on the 
discounting process and would be difficult to decipher econometrically.  Including sentiment 
effects in the risk aversion part of the valuation equation gave rise large effects on other 
parameters  in  the  valuation  metric  and  gives  unreliable  or  hard-to-interpret  results.    The  
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inclusion of the VIX in our premium estimate is likely to provide some representation of 
sentiment effects that are expressed in options markets. 
 
Cointegration and Error Correction 
 
The estimate of stock valuation i.e., the fitted value from the regression allows us to consider 
how its changes affect subsequent changes in value.  More directly, if the estimated intrinsic 
value is in-fact cointegrated with market value then divergence between the predicted value 
and the market price can be treated as a disequilibrium that will be corrected on average over 
time by price changes or valuation changes (or both) to restore equilibrium.  Econometrically, 
this  error  correction  term  should  be  a  significant  driver  of  market  returns  if  we  are  to 
conclude that the fundamental valuation drives price rather than vice-versa.  This is also a 
way to test for overt-fitting biases.  If the fit is soley produced by excess complexity this will 
fail to significantly improve the predictive ability of the implied disequilibrium term.  Testing 
for such effects is an approach taken by previous studies (e.g., Campbell and Schiller, 1988a 
and 1988b, and Lee et al. 1999).  It is also common in the macroeconomic literature on wealth 
effects and budget constraints, such as, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Whelan (2008) and 
Sousa (2010).  Previous studies in the finance field often rely on the price-to-earnings ratio as 
a disequilibrium driving returns but these ratios are often not well behaved, particularly when 
the forecast horizon is changing infrequently and when earnings themselves happen to be near 
zero  or  are  negative.    The  valuation  changes  from  the  valuation  model  above  are  more 
appropriate in an ECM context than price-to-earnings ratios since estimated value is usually 
close to price and is based on capitalizing more than a single estimate of earnings.   
 
We extend the error correction methodology to encompass disequilibria from the two main 
equations for valuation (the „with‟ and „without‟ sentiment cases).  We estimate the following 
ECM representation for returns; 
                                                                                 
    (3) 
Where: 
i =1 to n depending on significance of parameters and until a white noise error is obtained, 




             is  the  recent  log  changes  in  fitted  values  from  the  „with-sentiment‟  valuation 
equation, 
         is the lagged error term from the „with-sentiment‟ regression (since the regressions 
are conducted in logs the error can be interpreted as a disequilibrium in the P/    ratio), 
         is the lagged gap between the valuation with and without sentiment (where the error 
can be interpreted as a disequilibrium in the    /    ratio), 
            are coefficients to be estimated. 
 
In our empirical analysis we test the residuals from the two basic valuation equations for 
stationarity  using  standard  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test  restrictions.    We  also  examine 
whether the ECM regression gives rise to  a significantly negative estimates of              .  
Negative coefficients imply that stock returns act to re-equilibrate the relationship between 
market price and the with-sentiment valuation as well as to reflect the deviation between the 
„with‟ and „without‟ sentiment valuations.  From this we can ascertain whether market price 
adjusts  more  quickly  to  undo  sentiment  disequilibrium  rather  than  fundamental 
disequilibrium.  It is plausible that this re-equilibration is not well determined as an average 
relation  but  we  leave  the  pursuit  of  a  “threshold”  error  correction  model  for  future 
exploration.  Furthermore, the ECM result is not necessary for the compilation of the index of 




Our analysis is applied to the DOW 30 stocks (specifically the DOW 30 members on 30
th July 
2004 with index weights shown in Table 2).  Our sample runs from January 1996 to March 
2004.    This period includes the dot-com bubble and collapse and also the market reaction to 
the events of 9/11 2001.  For these stocks we obtain the end-of-month price per share and the 
consensus IBES forecasts of earnings per share.  IBES earnings forecasts are „core earnings‟ 
forecasts  that  ignore  many  contributions  to  earnings  that  are  transitory,  such  as  surprise 
income from the sale of assets, asset revaluations or unusual additions to goodwill.  IBES 
earnings  forecasts  are  up-dated  at  monthly  frequency.  However,  these  forecasts  relate  to 
future  horizons  that  change  only  on  an  annual  basis.  The  IBES  earnings  forecasts  for  a 
representative member of the DOW 30 are illustrated in Figure 1.  The significant jumps 
occur when the forecast horizon moves from one year-end to another.  The FY1 forecast is  
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focused on the next annual earnings report, which can be after the end of the year to which the 
earnings report pertains.  For example, if the year-end is December but the release date of the 
earnings  report is the following March, then the FY1 forecast in  December will have an 
information  horizon  which  is  three  months  beyond  the  date  of  the  forecast  but  a  value 
recognition date which is contemporaneous.  Likewise, the forecast made in January will 
often refer back to the year that has just ended in December but for which data has not yet 
been released.  Once the official audited earnings data for the previous year is released the 
FY1 forecast (such as that made in April) will be for the year ending the following December, 
a forecast horizon of 8 months.  The FY2 forecasts refer to the earnings that are to be released 
in the year ending 12 months after the FY1 year-end. Thus the maximum distance of the 
forecast horizon from the date of forecasting is 20 months in the case of FY2.   
 
We employ SPF forecasts of growth-relevant variables.
14  The two variables included are the 
forecast for the 10 year average growth in real GDP and the forecast for 10 year annual 
average inflation expected.  The average ten year ahead annual growth rate expected in real 
GDP over the sample period is  2.8%.  The  average ten year ahead  CPI is 2.25%.   These 
variables  are not updated at a monthly frequency   (they are quarterly).  We simply carry 
forward the most recent quarterly observations to fill-out the missing months.  Our valuation 
is based on nominal earnings and price per share.  Since the expected discount rate taken from 
the SPF is a nominal rate that would be expected to take account of inflation expectations, it is 
normally appropriate to include only a real growth rate in a Gordon growth -type equation.  
However we allow for the fact that there may be  money illusion and also for the fact that 
expected inflation could act as an indicator for future policy variables that would affect long 
term earnings growth. 
  
We represent the amount of equity market risk with the VIX index.  Specifically, we use a re-
scaled value for the VIX in our estimation of equations (1) and (2), VIX/10.   In this rescaled 
form the historical median is 1.888 which is the long-run value assumed to apply (denoted as 
          in equation 1).  Conventional estimation of beta is backward-looking, based on historical 
data used in the context of the one factor CAPM.  In a recent paper, Christoffersen, Jacobs 
and Vainberg (2008) argue that computation of time-varying, historic-based betas, or even 
betas based on „realized‟ covariance, represent a second best solution.  Rather, they propose a 
                                                 
14 The SPF data is freely available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia‟s web library, 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-centre/survey-of-professional-forecasters/   
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method for estimating forward-looking betas from information that is embedded in options 
prices.  Using the single factor CAPM they express the forward looking beta as a function of 
the implied variance and implied skewness from the distributions of individual stock and 
index option prices.  We make use of the estimates of Christoffersen et al., simply regarding 
them as an exogenous input into our analysis.  These are available at a daily frequency but we 
take the end of month observations. 
 
We obtained the investor sentiment index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2007) directly 
from  Jeffrey  Wurgler‟s  web  library.  As  Baker  and  Wurgler  acknowledge,  there  are  no 
definitive or uncontroversial measures of investor sentiment.  Nevertheless they base their 
index on a principal components analysis of six well known indicators from previous work by 
other authors.  These include, (i)  the closed-end fund discount (CEFD),  (ii) NYSE share 
turnover, (iii & iv) the number and average first-day returns on IPOs, (v) the equity share in 
new  issues,  and  (vi)  the  dividend  premium.    They  discuss  in  detail  how  each  of  these 
indicators is expected to relate to sentiment.  While this index is not necessarily equal to zero 
for neutral sentiment, for expositional purposes, we make this convenient assumption.  We 
chose this measure of investor sentiment in preference to survey based measures to avoid 




In this section we discuss the results associated with the regression estimates of parameters 
and certain partial derivatives of equations (2) and (3).  The significance of the regression 
results  and  the  post  regression  tests  indicate  that  sentiment  has  important  effects  on  risk 
aversion and on the perceptions of growth prospects.  The best way to portray these effects is 
in  graphical  terms.    We  therefore  calculate  and  show  the  proportional  contribution  of 
sentiment to valuation of the DOW 30 and of sub-sectors of the market over time based on 
aggregating the effects at an equity-specific level. The proportional difference between the 
valuation-fit, „with‟ and „without‟ sentiment, provides one of our measures of the valuation 
effects of sentiment.  We create an index of the valuation effects of sentiment using relative 
implied growth rates at a market-wide level and for various sectors.  We graphically display a 
number of other important and interesting  auxiliary  variables.  These include the ex ante 
implied risk premium and the implied Gordon growth-type rates.  We discuss how these  
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variables  evolve  over  time  and  in  relation  to  sentiment.  All  results  were  obtained  by 
application of nonlinear least squares estimations that were carried out using the „NLLS‟ 
routine in the RATS© software package.
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Price-Value Relation (Full Sample) 
  
The important outputs from the regression results associated with equations (2) and (3) are 
presented in Table 1, panels A to C.  These results pertain to regression analysis using the full 
sample of data.  We return later to results from a rolling regression based on available data at 
each date.  In all cases we show the standard error (or significance level) associated with 
parameter estimates (test statistics) below the point estimate in parentheses. In the case of 
equation (2), we present the following; 
(i) the estimated risk aversion parameter, „Q‟,  
(ii) the estimated partial derivative of Gordon growth with respect to sentiment, 
  
  ,  
(iv) stationarity tests on the residuals from this regression (specifically, ADF tests 
based  on  Dickey  and  Fuller,  1979  assessed  with  critical  values  from  MacKinnon, 
1996).   
 
The table also contains results of tests as follows; 
(i) a test for the statistical validity of restricting the risk aversion parameters to be 
equal to 0.015 (approximately the average of the stock-specific estimates) and,  
(ii) a test for the exclusion of the Fama-French and momentum factors (where a more 
general model was estimated to perform the test).   
 
Finally, in the case of equation (3) – the ECM regression – we show the following; 
(i) the ECM parameter estimates    and   , and, 
(ii) the adjusted R-squared for the returns regression. 
 
It  can  be  seen  from  the  results  in  Column  1  of  Table  1  that  the  estimated  risk  aversion 
parameter, Q, is significantly positive in most cases and has a magnitude that is consistent 
with a reasonably sized risk premium.  In the one case where it is negative it is statistically 
insignificantly different from zero.   The average size of Q is approximately 0.015.  The risk 
                                                 
15 The RATS code is available from the authors on request.  
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premium is the product of   and the VIX index (divided by 10) so we can conclude that the 
implied  risk  premium  is  approximately  3.5%  on  average.
16  The  cross-stock  variation in 
estimated Q is not large once certain outliers are excluded.  There are 15 stocks with estimates 
for Q lying between 0.011 and 0.019. Figure 2 shows the  ex ante risk premium implied by 
Q=0.015 which is simply multiplied by the VIX index. 
 
The effect of sentiment is given by the estimate of the derivative 
  
   which is shown in Column 
2  of Table 1  (evaluated at  average values of GDP10 and CPI10).   This  shows the  point 
estimate  of  the  effect  of  sentiment  on  the  long-run  growth  in  earnings.
17  This has the 
expected positive sign in 25 cases and it is highly statistically significant in 19 cases.  The 
range of values for this parameter is quite large (with 1
st and 3
rd quartiles equal to 0.055 and 
0.57 respectively).  This variability probably reflects the differential effects of sentiment due 
to different firm characteristics as described by Baker and Wurgler (2007).  We would expect 
well established manufacturing firms to be less affected by sentiment and firms in new growth 
sectors to be more affected.  A view of the growth effects that are implied by the „with‟ and 
„without‟  sentiment  regressions  can  easily  be  seen  by  plotting  the  terms 
                               and                                     
respectively.  Figures 3 shows these implied growth rates for the Finance stocks, Technology 
stocks and other stocks over the sample.  This confirms the fact that sentiment contributes 
significantly to implied growth (particularly around the dot-com period) and it also shows that 
Finance and Tech stocks were more prone to these effects.  The divergence between growth 
rates implied by the „with‟ sentiment valuation and that implied by the „without‟ sentiment 
valuation begins sometime in early 1999.  The peak of the „with‟ sentiment implied growth 
rate series occurs a year after the collapse of the dot-com bubble in March 2000. 
 
Table  1,  Column  3  shows  the  ADF  test  results  for  the  residuals  from  equation  (1).  
Cointegration is a concept that is not well established in the context of non-linear relations.  
However, after capitalization of earnings it is plausible that the underlying price-value relation 
is  linear  implying  that  the  residuals  from  the  main  regression  should  be  stationary  and 
amenable to stationarity testing in the usual way, and that an error correction representation 
                                                 
16 Christoffersen et al. refer to the potential presence of slight bias in their forward looking betas when they 
compare them with other beta measures such as the realized beta (see Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Wu 
2006).  So the implied premium may be understated slightly. 
17 The „summarize‟ function in RATS allows post-regression evaluation of combinations of coefficients and 
produces standard errors for these combinations.  
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is also valid. Much of the sensitivity of residual based tests of cointegration concerns the 
number  of  variables  in  the  relation  and  whether  there  is  a  constant  and  trend  in  the 
cointegrating relation.  We have been rigorous in not allowing any constant or trend in the 
estimation of equation 2.  Assuming the basic underlying relation is linear we use critical 
values for the ADF test of stationarity of the residuals from equation 2 based on the work of 
MacKinnon (1996).
18  We find that all  of the regressions have residual series that can be 
rejected as non-stationary at the 5% level of significance or better.  We conclude from this 
that the price and fitted value based on equation 2 are cointegrated.  The same conclusion can 
be  made  about  the  difference  between  the  fitt ed  values  from  the  „with‟  and  „without‟ 
sentiment versions of the model but we omit this result from Table 1 for clarity of exposition.  
At a „meta‟ level there is strong evidence for cointegration using this valuation approach.   
 
Column 4 in Table 1 has results for the tests of the restriction that the stock-specific risk 
aversion parameter is equal to 0.015 which is the average of the estimates from all stocks.  
This test statistic is Chi-Square distributed under the null of acceptance.  We find that the 
restriction is rejected in 17 cases.  Importantly however, we found that there was very little 
impairment  of  the  growth  effects  of  sentiment  even  when  the  restriction  was  imposed.
19 
Column 5 contains test results for the joint exclusion of Fama-French and Momentum factors.  
The exclusion of these factors is jointly accepted in two-thirds of cases. 
 
The results from estimation of equation (3) are provided in  columns 6 to 8  of Table 1.  In 
column 6 we show the parameter estimate on the lagged price/value ratio, where the value is 
from the „with‟ sentiment regression.  We expect this parameter to have a negative sign and 
this  is  confirmed  in  27  cases  out  of  30.    However,  only  a  small  number  of  these  are 
significantly negative using the MacKinnon critical values (there are two coefficient estimates 
that are significantly negative at the 10% level, 3 at the 5% level and 2 at the 1% level).  Thus, 
                                                 
18 We use estimates of 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for ADF, from MacKinnon 1996, with N=1, assuming 
no constant or trend in the cointegrating relation.  For any sample size T, the estimated critical value is     
              where the following table provides the required parameters and the ADF critical values (cv) 
used in our analysis in the final column;  
Level              ADF cv 
1%  -2.5658  -1.96  -10.04  -2.58662 
5%  -1.9393  -0.398     -1.94332 
10%  -1.6156  -0.181     -1.61743 
 
19 In earlier versions of this paper we imposed a common risk aversion parameter based on the estimated risk 
aversion in the case of an “easy-to-value” stock.  We picked the “easy-to-value” stock using characteristics 
suggested by Baker and Wurgler (2007).  The results were not qualitatively different from what we present here.  
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it is difficult to find strong evidence that market price adjusts in response to this implied mis-
valuation at a stock-specific level.  However, with the vast majority of coefficients negative it 
is likely that there is a significant error correction effect at a portfolio level.   The 7
th column 
contains  the results  for  the other error  correction term  (the lagged deviation between the 
„with‟ sentiment valuation and the „without‟ sentiment valuation).  In this case the results is 
slightly  weaker,  with  22  negative  estimates  only  3  of  which  are  significant  using  the 
MacKinnon critical values.  Once again however, at a „meta‟ level, we regard this as evidence 
in favour of re-equilibration in respect of this disequilibrium.  Overall there is evidence that 
both of the disequilibria are reversed by appropriately signed future returns but the effect is 
not strong.  However, it should be noted that the effect may be difficult to identify as an 
average relation.  If there are infrequent „corrections‟ responsible for re-equilibration then the 
ECM  parameter  estimates  may  not  fully  reflect  this  since  they  are  based  on  an  average 
relation present over the whole sample.  We present the      from the ECM regression in the 
last column.  Twenty five of these are positive, with 16 greater than 5% and 7 that are above 
10%.  While it is desirable to have good predictive power in the ECM regression this is not a 
necessary condition for obtaining a good indicator of the valuation effects of sentiment (which 
is a „levels‟ rather than „returns‟ concept). Since the ECM term and the other variables are 
given in percentage terms the speed of error correction from the ECM parameter estimates 
can be inferred.  The median value of the ECM parameters estimates on both ECM terms is 
approximately -0.05.  If the disequilibria are on average 10% of price, then returns adjustment 
each period may be as great as 0.5% of the price level.  The longer term adjustment can be 
assessed by regressing lower frequency returns on past disequilibrium but we leave this for 
future work. 
 
Valuation Effects of Sentiment 
 
The valuation effects of sentiment are very apparent when the two fitted valuations and the 
price are presented graphically.  Figure 4 shows this for the case of Hewlett-Packard.  Clearly, 
the stock market price during the period of the dot-com bubble is not well tracked by the pure 
fundamentals based valuation.  Once the investor sentiment variable is allowed to interact 
with the valuation metric we get better fits for this period.  Such sentiment effects can be 
detected in a number of specific cases.  Figure 5 shows the „with‟ and „without‟ valuations for 
different sectors and for the market as a whole.  The Finance and Technology sectors, for 
example, are well tracked by the sentiment valuation and there is a significant difference  
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between the „with‟ and „without‟ sentiment valuations in these cases.  In the case of „other 
stocks‟ the sentiment effect is less perceptible. 
  
To obtain an aggregate (or sector-specific) valuation effect from sentiment we calculate the 
weighted sum of           for the stocks of interest (where the weights are the DOW index 
weights). This measure shows how sentiment contributes to over- and under-valuation in a 
proportional  sense.  Since  the  „with‟  sentiment  valuation  can  overshoot  stock  price  it  is 
important  to  interpret  the  measure just proposed as  a stochastic variable that embodies  a 
frontier somewhere near its local average.  Based on a visual inspection of the equity-specific 
relative valuations, the „with‟ sentiment valuation is mostly between the „without‟ sentiment 
valuation and price when the two valuations are most different from each other.  We make 
some tentative suggestions later regarding what can be considered to be a „significant‟ gap 
between the two valuations. 
 
Figure 5 shows the effects of sentiment on valuation for the case of finance stocks, technology 
stocks, other stocks and  DOW30  stocks.    An  important  conclusion is that the valuation 
effects that can be attributed to sentiment are quite large.  When the sentiment index is at its 
peak, the valuation effect attributable to sentiment for Technology and Finance stocks is about 
50% in excess of the „without‟ sentiment valuation.  The largest effects are in the Finance 
sector.  The stocks denoted as  „other‟ are not  greatly endowed with value attributable to 
sentiment.  It is also important to note that the valuation effects attributable to sentiment can 
be negative.  This is true of the last 3 quarters of 2002 and most of 2003 for the Finance 
stocks. 
 
Based on this index of value attributable to sentiment, the dot-com bubble doesn‟t show-up 
until relatively late and when it appears it is relatively strong.  According to this measure the 
beginning of the dot-com bubble is apparent from November 1999 when the index of value 
attributable to sentiment (Finance sector) first breached 1.10.  It quickly rose to approximately 
1.30 in December 1999.  This elevated reading lasted until the end of March 2000 often cited 
as the date of the bursting of the dot-com bubble.  The index then declined for a 2 month 
period to near normal levels before rising again to almost 1.65 in August 2000.  This return to 
elevated  levels  confirms  views  expressed  by  Shiller  (2000)  that  the  market  was  still 
unrealistically priced in late 2000 despite the large market correction earlier in the year.  A 
decline to more normal levels occurred again in March of 2001.  We also note that this index  
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temporarily declined again in September 2001 to 0.91 following the 9/11 attacks.  But the 
effect  was  short-lived  until  about  6  months  later  when  sentiment  was  low  again  and  the 
valuations of sentiment-prone stocks were particularly negatively affected.   
 
The tardy signal regarding the appearance of the dot-com bubble produced by the valuation 
ratio  may  reduce  its  appeal  as  an  early  warning  indicator.    However,  an  analysis  of  the 
implied growth rates looks more promising.  Also, a careful analysis of the components of the 
valuation equation indicate an increasing potential for larger than average movements relating 
to sentiment.  The early 1999 divergences between implied growth rates („with‟ and „without‟ 
sentiment) give an earlier warning of mis-valuation than the comparison of the „with‟ and 
„without‟  sentiment  valuations.      This  reflects  the  fact  that  growth  rate  variability  feeds 
through as smaller valuation effects if at the same time interest rates rise.  The larger is the 
gap between the interest rate (plus the risk premium) and the implied growth rate, the smaller 
will be the effect of an increase in expected growth on value.  We therefore consider whether 
the relative implied growth rates themselves could act as an early warning indicator.  Figure 6 
shows  the  relative  growth  rates  implied  by  the  „with‟  and  „without‟  sentiment  valuations 
(analogous to the valuation ratios shown in Figure 5).  This shows that the relative growth 
attributable to sentiment was on the rise in mid 1999.  It also indicates that implied growth 
was largely sentiment driven in the early 1990s for the DOW as a whole. 
 
An  advantage  of  using  the  implied  growth  rates  in  statistical  terms  is  that  growth  rate 
estimates are likely to have simpler statistical properties than the valuations.  This facilitates 
construction of a significance level for the rejection of the hypothesis that the „with‟ sentiment 
implied growth is different from the „without‟ sentiment implied growth.  While such a test is 
not a measure of how different the valuations are under the two models it is likely to be easier 
to reject them as similar the larger is the magnitude of the gap.  The implied growth rates are 
restrained to be positive, since we square the growth sub-equation during estimation.  Under 
the  null  hypothesis  of  no  difference  between  the  „with‟  and  „without‟  sentiment  implied 
growth rates, we can regard the ratio of the average estimated growth rates from the „with‟ 
and  „without‟  sentiment  valuations  as  a  ratio  of  quasi  Chi-Squared  distributed  variables, 
which produces a ratio that is F-distributed under the null.  This in-turn allows us to make 
statements  with  statistical  confidence  regarding  the  likelihood  of  sentiment  effects  being 
present.  For the case of the DOW, there are 30 observations in each period and therefore the 
F-statistic will be F(30,30) distributed under the null.  Smaller groupings of stocks (such as  
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Finance stocks) will obviously lead to F-statistics with fewer degrees of freedom and this 
reduces the confidence with which the null hypothesis of „no difference between valuations‟ 
can be rejected. 
 
The significance levels for the F-statistics based on the ratio of average implied growth rates 
from the two valuations and for different groups of stocks are shown in Figure 7.  The smaller 
is  the  significance  level  the  higher  the  level  of  confidence  with  which  we  can  say  the 
valuations  are  different.    We  include  the  10%  bar  in  the  plots  to  show  when  the  null 
hypothesis can be rejected with more than 90% confidence.  We can observe from the first of 
these plots that the dot-com bubble is associated with a rejection of similarity between the 
valuations with 90% confidence.  This occurs as early as September 1999 for the tests based 
on the DOW 30.  Whatever about the prescience of this measure it is clear that when the 
significance level reaches virtually zero and remains there for a long time this should be taken 
as a clear signal that the „with‟ and „without‟  valuation differences are very unusual and 
should either produce arbitrage or prompt policy initiatives to bring valuations more in line 




In this  section we  give a heuristic account  of  an out-of-sample analysis.   While such an 
analysis is fraught with difficulty due to the non-linear, complex and unstable nature of the 
underlying relationship, we present it as an insightful exercise.  To get an indication as to how 
sentiment variation may translate into valuation effects in real time we conduct the „with‟ 
sentiment regression for an initial sample running from January 1996 to December 1999 and 
obtain one-step-ahead fits for the following components of the valuation equation; (i) implied 
growth, (ii) the required return on equity and (iii) the valuation fit.  Thus, we base the fit on 
the  value  of  the  explanatory  variables  in  the  period  ahead  using  the  parameter  estimates 
derived  from  a  regression  using  a  sample  that  predates  this  period.    We  then  roll  the 
regression forward each period recalculating the parameters (when possible) and deriving a 
one-step-ahead fit for the same three components for the next period.   
 
An  analysis  of  the  components  of  the  valuation  equation  reveals  how  the  valuation  fit 
sometimes behaves in an unstable way due to a high sensitivity to movements in   when 
       is close to zero.  Indeed, it is possible for predictions of   to exceed the predicted  
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required return on equity.  This produces a negative valuation fit.  This is not just an issue for 
the out-of-sample context.  When parameter estimates are based on a short enough sample, 
large outliers will also give rise to in-sample negative valuation fits for which the taking of 
logs is an invalid operation given that our regression fits log of price with the log of value.  
The best course of action in this case is to drop the offending observations from estimation 
until a sufficient number of new observations are available with which to obtain non-negative 
valuation fits.  We know from the original analysis above that this happens for all periods 
when the sample is large enough.   As it turns out, the problem of negative one-step-ahead 
forecasts of value occurs mostly for those firms that are most prone to sentiment effects and it 
often takes a large number of new observations to be included before the problem is solved. 
 
While  it  may  seem  that  dropping  observations  from  estimation  is  a  deficiency  of  the 
methodology presented here we do not consider it so.  When the out-of-sample prediction 
produces           this  outcome  is  informative  even  when  the  estimates  upon  which  the 
prediction is based are a little out-of-date.  What it indicates is that sentiment effects are likely 
to cause problems for agents in ascertaining the underlying value of stocks.  It tells us that the 
valuation exercise in such circumstances is very sensitive to changes in the drivers of growth 
or required return on equity.  If a large part of predicted growth is attributable to sentiment 
then this should act as a warning that the market is becoming prone to significant sentiment 
effects.  It signals a need to monitor how the increased fragility of the market is feeding into 
risk aversion and predicted volatility. 
 
Figure 8 (panel A) shows out-of-sample predictions of growth and required return on equity 
implied by the estimated parameters from equation 2.  The gap between required return and 
growth is shown in panel B.  We use a weighted average of the growth and required return 
predictions for the case of a portfolio of non-finance and non-technology stocks (those stocks 
where the problem of dropped observations just discussed is not prevalent).  This reveals a 
sharp rise in the expected growth in Jan 2000 when there was a spike in investor sentiment.  
Over the periods that follow, the regression is updated and since sentiment levels remained 
relatively high, the estimated responsiveness of growth to sentiment declines (to ensure a 
better  fit).    Predicted  growth  therefore  falls  progressively  for  a  number  of  periods.  
Nevertheless  the  gap  between  growth  and  required  return  remains  relatively  small  and  a 
second wave of sentiment drives predicted growth up again towards the beginning of 2001.  
The gap between expected growth and required return remains small for most of 2001 after  
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which there is a return to more normal levels.  Predicted valuations (untabulated) are often 
very large relative to market valuation during periods when there is a small gap between 
required  return  and  growth.    It  might  be  expected  that  the  VIX  would  rise  in  these 
circumstances but we did not find this to be the case.  A rise in the VIX would have helped to 
stabilize  valuations  because  the  required  premium  would  then  have  compensated  for  the 
measurable increase in risks associated with outstanding growth predictions based largely on 
sentiment movements.  The lack of a reaction of this type remains somewhat puzzling and 




We use a well know and widely accepted valuation metric, the Gordon Growth model, as a 
basis for introducing measurable valuation effects of investor sentiment.  Identifying value 
attributable to sentiment is a significant step beyond how sentiment effects are evidenced in 
the extant literature.  This produces a policy-relevant tool and an indicator that can be used to 
understand potential causes and effects. We apply non-linear regression techniques to fit the 
price-value relation „with‟ and „without‟ sentiment.  We use ex ante variables throughout and 
introduce new variables that improve the reliability of the valuation approach.  These include 
forecasts of macroeconomic variables, options-based measures of risk and forward-looking 
betas.  We apply restrictions during estimation that maintain credible projections for growth 
rates and required rates of return.  Moreover, we propose an index of the value-relevance of 
sentiment  and  show  how  this  can  be  assessed  in  statistical  terms.    We  find  that  a  large 
proportion of market valuation can be attributed to sentiment.  This shows that sentiment 
effects are more pervasive than usually understood.  While the dot-com boom is identified as 
a period of excessive exuberance sentiment effects are shown to extend well beyond that 
episode.    An  out-of-sample  analysis  shows  that  the  projections  for  growth  can  exceed 
projected required rates of return when there are spikes in sentiment and we argue that this is 
informative.  By breaking down projections into components relating to growth and required 
return it is easier to identify when sentiment effects and policy changes will have most effect. 
 





Abarbanell,  J.  and  R.  Lehavy,  2003,  Biased  Forecasts  or  Biased  Earnings?  The  Role  of 
Reported  Earnings  in  Explaining  Apparent  Bias  and  Over/Underreaction  in  Analysts‟ 
Earnings Forecasts, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36:105-146. 
 
Adrian,  T.  and  F.,  Franzoni,  2009,  Learning  about  Beta:  Time-Varying  Factor  Loadings, 
Expected Returns, and the Conditional CAPM, Journal of Empirical Finance 16(4):537-556. 
 
Adrian, T. and H. S. Shin, 2008, Liquidity, Monetary Policy and Financial Cycles, Current 
Issues in Economics and Finance 14(1). 
 
Agnello, L. and L. Schuknecht, 2009, Booms and busts in housing markets: determinants and 
implications, Working Paper Series 1071, European Central Bank. 
 
Alessi,  L.  &  C.  Detken,  2009,  Real  Time  early  warning  indicators  for  costly  asset  price 
boom/bust cycles - a role for global liquidity, Working Paper Series 1039, European Central 
Bank. 
 
Andersen, T. G., T. Bollerslev, F. X. Diebold and J. Wu, 2006, Realized Beta: Persistence and 
Predictability, Econometric Analysis of Financial and Economic Time Series / Part B, T. 
Fomby and D. Terrell (Eds) Advances in Econometrics, Volume 20, 1-39. 
 
Baker, M. & J. Wurgler, 2006, Investor Sentiment and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 
Journal of Finance 61, 1645-1680.  
 
Baker, M. & J. Wurgler, 2007, Investor Sentiment in the Stock Market, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 21:2, 129-151.  
 
Benartzi, S. aned R. Thaler, 1995, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle, 




Bernanke, B. & M. Gertler, 2001, Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset 
Prices?  American Economic Review 91(2): 253-257 Papers and Proceedings of the 113th 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. 
 
Bordo, M. D. & O. Jeanne, 2002, Boom-Busts in Asset Prices, Economic Instability, and 
Monetary Policy, NBER Working Papers 8966. 
 
Brunnermeier, M. K., 2001, Asset Price Under Asymmetric Information: Bubbles, Crashes, 
Technical Analysis and Herding, Oxford University Press. 
 
Buss, A., C. Schlag & G. Vilkov, 2009, CAPM with Option-Implied Betas: Another Rescue 
Attempt,  Goethe  University  Finance  Department  Working  Paper.  SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342988. 
 
Campbell,  J.  Y.,  &  R.  Shiller,  1988a,  Cointegration  and  Tests  of  Present  Value  Models, 
Journal of Political Economy 95:1062-1088. 
 
Campbell, J. Y., & R. Shiller, 1988b, The Dividend-Price Ratio and Expectations of Future 
Dividends and Discount Factors, Review of Financial Studies 1:195-228. 
 
Campbell, J. Y., & T. Vuolteenaho, 2004, Bad Beta, Good Beta, American Economic Review 
94(5):1249-1279. 
 
Christoffersen P., K. Jacobs & G. Vainberg, 2008, Forward-Looking Betas, McGill University 
Working Paper. 
 
Ciciretti, R., G. P. Dwyer & I. Hasan, 2009,  Investment Analysts‟ Forecasts of Earnings, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 91:5(2), 545-567. 
 
Chung, San-Lin & Chung-Ying Yeh, 2009, Investor Sentiment, Regimes and Stock Returns.  
National Taiwan University w/p, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342588. 
 
Coudert, V., & M. Gex, 2007, Does Risk Aversion Drive Financial Crises? Testing the 




Detken, C., & F. Smets, 2004, Asset price booms and monetary policy.  Working Paper Series 
364, European Central Bank. 
 
Dickey, D. A., and W. A. Fuller, 1979, Distributions of the Estimators for Autoregressive 
Time Series with a Unit Root, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74:427-431. 
 
Easton, P. & G. Sommers, 2007, Effect of Analysts‟  Optimism on Estimates of the Expected 
Rate of Return Implied by Earnings Forecasts, Journal of Accounting Research 45:983-1015. 
 
Engle,  R.  F.  and  C.  W.J.  Granger,  1987,  Cointegration  and  Error-Correction:  Representation, 
Estimation, and Testing. Econometrica 55, pp. 531-554. 
 
Epstein, L. G. & M. Schneider, 2008, Ambiguity, Information Quality and Asset Pricing, 
Journal of Finance, 63(1):197-228. 
 
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French, 1993, Common Risk Factors in the Return on Stocks and 
Bonds, Journal of Financial Economics 33:3-56. 
 
Fama,  E. F., and  K. R. French, 1998, Value versus Growth:  The  International  Evidence. 
Journal of Finance 53: 1975-1999. 
 
Gerdesmeier D., H. Reimers, and B. Roffia, 2009, Asset Price Misalignments and the Role of 
Money and Credit. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 1068. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1429265 
 
Gordon,  M.,  1962,  The  investment,  financing  and  valuation  of  the  corporation  (Irwin, 
Homewood, IL). 
 
Haugen, R. A., and N. L. Baker, 1996, Commonality in the determinants of Expected Stock 




Haugen, R. A., and N. L. Baker, 2009, Case Closed, The Handbook of Portfolio Construction: 
Contemporary  Applications  of  Markowitz  Techniques,  John  B.  Guerard  Jn.,  ed., 
Forthcoming. 
 
Hirshleifer, D, 2001, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, Journal of Finance 56(4):1533-
1597. 
 
Kumar,  M.  S.  and  Avinash  Persaud,  2002,  Pure  Contagion  and  Investors‟  Shifting  Risk 
Appetite: Analytical Issues and Empirical Evidence, International Finance, 5:3, 401-436. 
 
Kumar, P., S. Srescu, R. Boehme and B. Danielsen, 2008,  Estimation Risk, Information, and 
the Conditional CAPM: Theory and Evidence, Review of Financial Studies 21, 1037-1075. 
 
Lee, C. M. C., J. Myers & B. Swaminathan, 1999, What is the Intrinsic Value of the Dow? 
Journal of Finance 54(5): 1693-1741. 
 
Lemmon, M. L. & S. X. Ni, 2008, The Effects of Investor Sentiment on Speculative Trading 
and Prices of Stock and Index Options, HK University of Science & Technology, SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306237. 
 
Lettau, M., and S. Ludvigson, 2001, Consumption, Aggregate Wealth and Expected Stock 
Returns, Journal of Finance, 41(3):815-849. 
 
Machado, J. A. F. and J. Sousa, 2006, Identifying asset price booms and busts with quantile 
regressions, Working Papers, Banco de Portugal, No. 8. 
 
MacKinnon,  R.,  1996,  Numerical  Distribution  Functions  for  Unit-Root  and  Cointegration 
Tests, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 140:719-752. 
 
Miller, M. H. & F. Modigliani, 1961, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, 
Journal of Business, 34:411-433. 
 





Newey,  W  and  K.  West,  1987,  A  Simple  Positive-Definite  Heteroscedasticity  and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix.  Econometrica, 55:703-708. 
 
Sharpe, S., 2002, Re-examining Stock Valuation and Inflation: The Implications of Analysts‟ 
Earnings Forecasts, Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(4):632-648. 
 
Shiller, R., 2000 & 2005, Irrational Exuberance, 1
st and 2
nd Eds. Princeton University Press. 
 
Sousa, R. M., 2010, Consumption, (Dis)-Aggregate Wealth and Asset Returns, Journal of 
Empirical Finance, 17(4):606-622. 
 
Whaley, R. E., 2008, Understanding VIX, mimeo: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296743 
 
Whelan, K., 2008, Consumption and Expected Asset Returns Without Assumptions about 
Unobservables, Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(7):1209-1221. 
 
White, H., 1980, A Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and Direct 
Test for Heteroscedasticity.  Econometrica, 48:817-838. 
 
Yuan,  K.,  2005,  Asymmetric  Price  Movements  and  Borrowing  Contraints:  A  Rational 
Expectations  Equilibrium  Model  of  Crisis,  Contagion  and  Confusion,  Journal  of  Finance 
60(1), 379-411. 
 
    
29 
 
Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. DIS Inc (Disney). EF1 and EF2 denote IBES Earnings Per-Share (EPS) forecasts for the current year (or if 
not yet released, the most recent year) and for the following year-end respectively.  ACT denotes the actual reported 
earnings.  The reported EPS are adjusted for stock splits so that the old numbers are directly comparable with EPS 




Figure 2: The ex ante premium associated with Q=0.015.  
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Figure 3: The two graphs in the first column contain plots of the weighted averages of the implied growth rates ‘with’ 
and ‘without’ sentiment in each period for stocks within the Finance and Technology sectors (the weights are the 
index weights).    The top graph in the second column contains the same variable for all other stocks in the Dow 30.  




Figure 4: An example of valuations ‘with’ and ‘without’ sentiment.  The Price per share of Hewlett-Packard stock and 




























































































Figure 5: These plots show the average of ‘with’ sentiment valuation relative to the ‘without’ sentiment valuation for 
Finance, Technology, Other Stocks and the DOW 30.  The weighted averages are based on the DOW 30 weights.   
 
Figure 6: These plots show the average of ‘with’ sentiment implied growth relative to the ‘without’ sentiment implied 
growth for Finance, Technology, Other Stocks and the DOW 30.  The weighted averages are based on the DOW 30 
weights.  Note the change of scale for the case of Technology stocks. 

















































































































































































































Figure 7: These plots show the significance levels for the ratio of ‘with’ and ‘without’ sentiment implied growth rates 
for Finance, Technology, Other Stocks and DOW 30 stocks.  The 0.10 line is given as a benchmark for rejecting the 
hypothesis of no difference between the implied growth rates.  The degrees of freedom for the tests are dependent on 
the number of stocks used to obtain the average each period (DOW = 30, Finance = 5, Technology = 8, Other = 17).   
 
Figure 8: For the case of non-financial firms and non-technology firms we show the weighted average of the implied 
growth and the required rate of return based on parameter estimates from the regression based on equation (2).  The 
pre-sample period is January 1996 to December 1999. The regression rolled forward to include available information 
before the one-step-ahead predictions are calculated.   Panel A shows the predicted growth and required return 
separately.  Panel B shows the gap between required return and predicted growth. 
Significance Level for Ratio of Implied Growth Rates













































































































































<-- Start of rolling predictionTable 1, Panel A. 
 




  ADF   
Chi-Sq-Test 




   
ECM 
   
  ECM 
   
Alcoa (AA)  0.021*** 
 




(0.131)      (0.00)  (0.294)  (0.051)  (0.322)     
Am Exp (AXP)  0.015*** 
 




(0.092)      (0.879)  (0.318)  (0.053)  (0.086)     
AIG (AIG)  0.015*** 
 




(0.092)      (0.968)  (0.073)  (0.046)  (0.055)     
Boeing (BA)  0.013*** 
 




(0.093)      (0.042)  (0.976)  (0.054)  (0.206)     
Caterpillar (CAT)  0.027*** 
 
-0.822




(0.34)      (0.00)  (0.048)  (0.045)  (0.108)     
J P Morgan (JPM)  0.029*** 
 




(0.193)      (0.00)  (0.461)  (0.059)  (0.213)     
City (C)  0.024*** 
 




(0.144)      (0.00)  (0.074)  (0.06)  (0.097)     
Coca Cola (KO)  0.000 
 




(0.115)      (0.00)  (0.568)  (0.039)  (0.121)     
Disney (DIS)  0.008*** 
 




(0.091)      (0.001)  (0.427)  (0.054)  (0.091)     
Du Pont (DD)  0.012*** 
 




(0.022)      (0.116)  (0.73)  (0.04)  (4.243)     
Table 1 (Panel A): Columns 1 and 2 contain estimates (std. errors in parentheses) of the risk aversion parameter, ‘Q’, and the derivative of the implied Gordon growth rate with 
respect to sentiment from estimation of equation (2);                         
            
 
              
            
 
      
                       , where,                        
                   .  Column 3 contains the ADF statistic testing for stationarity of the residuals from equation (2).  Column 4 contains results of the test (significance level in 
parentheses) of the restriction that the equity-specific risk aversion parameter is equal to the mean value of estimates across stocks.  Column 5 shows the test statistic (and significance 
level) for the joint significance of Fama-French and momentum factors.  Columns 6 and 7 contain estimates of    and    from the ECM regression show as equation (3) in the 
text;                                                                               , where                     
    and                       
   .  The      statistic for the ECM 
regression is shown in the final column.  Significant coefficient estimates at 10, 5 and 1 percent are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.  We change these to 
+, ++, +++ if the sign of the 




Table 1, Panel B. 




  ADF   
Chi-Sq Test 




   
ECM 
   
ECM 
   
Exxon (XOM)  0.011*** 
 




(0.063)      (0.155)  (0.926)  (0.042)  (0.139)   
Gen Elect (GE)  0.012*** 
 




(0.099)      (0.216)  (0.009)  (0.037)  (0.04)   
Gen Motor (GM)  0.063*** 
 




(0.499)      (0.00)  (0.238)  (0.034)  (0.284)   
Hewlett-Pac (HPQ)  0.011*** 
 




(0.248)      (0.354)  (0.744)  (0.05)  (0.134)   
Home Depot (HD)  0.009*** 
 




(0.124)      (0.05)  (0.602)  (0.036)  (0.051)   
Honeywell (HON)  0.016*** 
 




(0.115)      (0.253)  (0.002)  (0.091)  (0.336)   
Intel Corp. (INTC)  0.004** 
 




(0.129)      (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.064)  (0.165)   
IBM (IBM)  0.016*** 
 




(0.141)      (0.65)  (0.047)  (0.043)  (0.067)   
Johnson & J (JNJ)  0.006*** 
 




(0.054)      (0.00)  (0.536)  (0.05)  (0.089)   
MacDonald (MCD)  0.015*** 
 




(0.098)      (0.282)  (0.931)  (0.052)  (0.114)   
Table notes as for Panel A. 
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Table 1, Panel C. 




  ADF   
Chi-Sq Test 




   
ECM 
   
ECM 
   
Merck (MRK)  0.013*** 
 




(0.101)      (0.378)  (0.791)  (0.044)  (0.074)   
Microsoft (MSFT)  0.004*** 
 




(0.106)      (0.00)  (0.275)  (0.052)  (0.114)   
3M (MMM)  0.006*** 
 




(0.053)      (0.00)  (0.022)  (0.075)  (0.326)   
Pfizer (PFE)  0.013*** 
 




(0.134)      (0.525)  (0.994)  (0.027)  (0.047)   
Altria (MO)  0.041*** 
 




(0.714)      (0.00)  (0.061)  (0.046)  (0.301)   
Proctor (PG)  0.006*** 
 




(0.073)      (0.00)  (0.153)  (0.054)  (1.194)   
AT&T (SBC)  0.019*** 
 




(0.126)      (0.008)  (0.794)  (0.065)  (0.083)   
United Tech (UTX)  0.014*** 
 




(0.10)      (0.249)  (0.239)  (0.086)  (0.172)   
Verizon (VZ)  0.017*** 
 




(0.094)      (0.016)  (0.041)  (0.089)  (0.143)   
Walmart (WMT)  0.004** 
 




(0.073)      (0.00)  (0.346)  (0.047)  (0.074)   
Table notes as for Panel A. 
   Ticker  Name (Index Weight)  Ticker  Name (Index Weight) 
AA  ALCOA INC (2.31)  HON  HONEYWELL (2.57) 
AXP  AMERICAN EXPRESS (3.67)  INTC  INTEL CORP (1.89) 
AIG  AMERICAN INTL (5.13)  IBM  IBM (6.24) 
BA  BOEING CO (3.55)  JNJ  JOHNSON & JOHNSON (3.97) 
CAT  CATERPILLAR (5.50)  MCD  MCDONALDS (1.87) 
JPM  J P MORGAN (2.73)  MRK  MERCK & CO (3.36) 
C  CITIGROUP INC (3.28)  MSFT  MICROSOFT (2.05) 
KO  COCA COLA CO (3.62)  MMM  3M CO (6.27) 
DIS  DISNEY WALT CO (1.81)  PFE  PFIZER INC (2.43) 
DD  DU PONT (3.12)  MO  ALTRIA GROUP (3.56) 
XOM  EXXON MOBIL (3.21)  PG  PROCTER & GAMBLE (3.89) 
GE  GENERAL ELEC CO (2.27)  T/SBC  AT&T / SBC COMM INC (1.73) 
GM/MTLQQ  GENERAL MTR LIQ CO (3.24)  UTX  UNITED TECH (6.42) 
HPQ  HEWLETT PACKARD (1.46)  VZ  VERIZON (2.59) 
HD  HOME DEPOT INC (2.49)  WMT  WAL MART (3.72) 
Table 2: Ticker symbols and names for the stocks under analysis and the index weights as at 5
th July 2004. 